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Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope
by
ANDREAS ROIDER∗
This paper studies a partial-contracting model where an agent may provide ef-
fort to increase a project’s scope before some later (operative) decisions have to
be taken. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we find a positive relation-
ship between exogenous risk and delegation. That is, only if the exogenous risk is
sufficiently large may the risk-neutral principal prefer to delegate authority over
decisions to the risk-averse agent. Intuitively, for incentive reasons, the princi-
pal may optimally want to allow the agent to reduce his risk exposure. Neverthe-
less, even endogenous risk may be higher when the risk-averse agent has control.
(JEL: D 86, D 21, D 23, G 34, L 14)
1 Introduction
Motivation. Authority over decision-making is frequently delegated to lower lev-
els of a hierarchy. For example, RAJAN AND WULF [2006] document that over the
last decades entire layers of hierarchies in firms have been eliminated (i.e., more
and more managers report directly to the CEO), and more managers are being ap-
pointed officers of the firm. This trend towards more delegation of authority raises
the question under which circumstances it is optimal for a principal to grant lower
tiers the right to take relevant decisions.1
Interestingly, there is evidence for a positive relationship between exogenous
risk and delegation, i.e., there seems to be more delegation in settings that are
more risky. At first sight, this observation might be surprising, because one could
argue that risk-averse managers might try to reduce total firm risk at the expense
of the expected return, which would not be in the best interest of (well-diversified)
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1 At the same time, the above evidence indicates that CEOs are getting directly
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shareholders.2 This line of reasoning would imply a negative relationship between
risk and delegation, contrary to what has been found in the empirical literature. In
particular, in a recent study on the retail banking sector NAGAR [2002] finds that
high-growth, volatile, and innovative retail banks delegate more authority to branch
managers. In the franchising context, LAFONTAINE [1992] considers the decision of
potential franchisors either to operate a given store directly (i.e., to keep it company-
owned) or to franchise it (where a franchisee has considerably greater autonomy in
decision-making). Considering a variety of industries (such as fast-food restaurants,
business aids and services, construction and maintenance, and nonfood retailing),
LAFONTAINE [1992] finds that the higher is the exogenous risk (measured by the
average proportion of discontinued outlets), the more likely is a given store to be
franchised (for a survey of related results, see LAFONTAINE AND BHATTACHARYYA
[1995]).3 Finally, ACEMOGLU et al. [2007] study three large data sets of French and
British manufacturing firms and find that firms that are closer to the technological
frontier, firms in more heterogeneous environments, and younger firms are more
likely to decentralize decision-making.
In the present paper, we identify a novel channel through which higher exoge-
nous risk might make delegation more desirable. As discussed above, delegation
of authority may allow agents to reduce their risk exposure, and we show that this
may in fact be beneficial from a principal’s perspective if large risk would stifle an
agent’s initiative (i.e., delegation may be desirable for incentive reasons).
An Illustrative Example: The Hudson’s Bay Company Case. To illustrate our main
idea, we briefly discuss the Hudson’s Bay Company case – a historic example that
has frequently been employed to highlight the relevance of organizational design for
firm performance (see, e.g., MILGROM AND ROBERTS [1992], ROBERTS [2004], and
the references cited therein). In 1670, Hudson’s Bay Company (henceforth, HBC)
was granted a royal monopoly by King Charles II of England for trade with all lands
draining into the Hudson Bay. Having approximately fifteen times the size of the
UK, at that time Hudson Bay was a trackless wilderness sparsely populated by some
aboriginal people, but rich in animal fur, which was in high demand in Europe. Fur
trade was HBC’s main business. HBC had set up half a dozen forts on the shores
of Hudson Bay, waiting for customers seeking European-made goods in exchange
for their furs. In the course, it amassed huge profits. Then, in 1779, the North West
Company of Montreal (henceforth, NWC) entered the market. Initially, this did not
seem to be a threat, because NWC faced a huge cost disadvantage: due to HBC’s
royal monopoly, NWC could not ship goods through Hudson Bay. Instead, it was
forced to first transport furs and other goods over land to Montreal, resulting in costs
2 See AMIHUD AND LEV [1981] and MAY [1995] for discussions of this issue and
for empirical evidence in the context of conglomerate mergers. In the context of firms’
financing decisions, LEWELLEN [2006] documents that managers’ behavior is influ-
enced by their desire to reduce the riskiness of their personal income streams.
3 For a discussion of various empirical measures of risk, see LAFONTAINE [1992,
pp. 271ff.].
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twice as high as HBC’s. Nevertheless, by 1809 NWC had an 80% market share and
was immensely profitable, while HBC was near bankruptcy.
How did this come about? In this connection, it is important to note that, while
being in the same business, HBC and NWC had markedly different organizational
designs. In the case of HBC, decision-making (for example, on prices and on how
business was to be conducted) was centralized in headquarters in London.4 More-
over, given the geography and climate of Hudson Bay, there was only very limited
possibility for communication between local employees and London: ships were
able to bring in goods (and new instructions) from Europe only once a year. This
lack of flexibility to conduct business as they saw fit stifled the local employees’
initiative to trade with people far from the bay: given the wilderness and the uncer-
tainties of demand and supply, such trade involved huge risks. In contrast to HBC’s
approach, NWC had erected dozens of trading posts inland right where the furs
where collected. In addition, decision-making was delegated to local “Nor’westers,”
thereby giving them the opportunity to better adjust to the perceived risks and giving
them an incentive to actually go to the remote areas. Initially, HBC was slow to react
to NWC’s challenge, but eventually it simply copied NWC’s organizational design
and – given its cost advantage – by 1820 had absorbed NWC through a merger.
As the Hudson’s Bay Company case illustrates, agents may be reluctant to increase
the scope of operations if they anticipate that through later decisions a principal
exposes them to a lot of risk. Frequently, it will be difficult for a principal to commit
to a certain (less risky) course of action beforehand. Hence, delegating authority to
the agent (thereby allowing him to proceed as he sees fit) may provide the principal
with a credible way of reducing the agent’s risk exposure (and, as a consequence,
may raise the agent’s initiative).5 Such considerations will be the more important,
the higher is exogenous risk in the first place, and hence through this channel higher
exogenous risk may make delegation more desirable from a principal’s perspective.
Model and Results. To formalize our idea, we consider a partial-contracting model
where a risk-neutral principal (she) hires a risk-averse agent (him) to conduct
a project. Only the agent is able to provide some noncontractible effort that ex-
pands the scope of the project. Subsequent decisions are taken under uncertainty
and may be made by either the principal or the agent (in case the principal decides
to delegate authority). In line with the emerging literature on partial contracting,
we assume that only control over the decisions (not the decisions themselves) are
contractible. Finally, uncertainty regarding the state of the world is resolved, and
the payoffs of the parties are realized. In order to focus on the effect of risk on the
desirability of delegation, we assume that the principal and the agent only differ in
their risk attitudes, and we abstract from other potential conflicts of interest between
the parties.
4 This form of governance was meant to counter the perceived danger of its (far
away) employees frittering away or misappropriating profits.
5 Clearly, NWC’s organizational design was most likely also superior in making
use of local knowledge.
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We obtain the following results. First, in line with the empirical evidence, we find
that, for sufficiently low levels of exogenous risk, the risk-neutral principal prefers
to retain control over decisions. However, if there is a sufficiently pronounced risk–
return trade-off, then, for sufficiently large exogenous risk, it is strictly optimal for
the principal to delegate authority to the risk-averse agent. That is, in the model
there is a positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation. Second, this
result provides an incentive-based reason why even a risk-neutral principal may
find it optimal to allow an agent to reduce his risk exposure. Third, in the model
the equilibrium project risk (measured by the variance of the project return) is
endogenous and depends on the effort and decisions taken. Perhaps surprisingly,
it is possible that even endogenous risk is higher when authority over decisions is
delegated to the risk-averse agent (i.e., there might even be a positive relationship
between endogenous risk and delegation).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss the
related literature. The model is introduced in section 3, and section 4 contains the
results. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
The present paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, in its under-
lying idea, the paper is related to the literature that explains delegation through
its function as a commitment device.6 That is, through delegation of authority
to an agent (who behaves differently), a principal might be able to reduce time-
inconsistency problems (where the principal prefers some behavior ex ante, to which,
however, she cannot commit later on). On the one hand, such delegation might be
advantageous in strategic interactions with third parties (see, e.g., ROGOFF [1985],
VICKERS [1985], SAPPINGTON [1986], FERSHTMAN AND JUDD [1987], MELUMAD
AND MOOKHERJEE [1989]). On the other hand, as in the present paper, delegation
might be optimal because it convinces the agent that the principal will not inter-
fere ex post, thereby raising the agent’s incentives ex ante (see, e.g., AGHION AND
TIROLE [1997], BURKART, GROMB, AND PANUNZI [1997]). AGHION AND TIROLE
[1997] consider a similar sequence of events,7 but they differ from the present pa-
per in the interpretation of the effort of the agent. While in AGHION AND TIROLE
[1997] the agent expends effort to acquire information about the prospects of various
courses of action, in our model the agent’s effort increases the scope of the project,
i.e., its size. Moreover, AGHION AND TIROLE [1997] do not study the relationship
between risk and delegation.
Second, the paper is part of the literature that investigates how a positive relation-
ship between exogenous risk and delegation might arise (see e.g., PRENDERGAST
6 For recent surveys of the literature on delegation, see, e.g., MOOKHERJEE [2006]
and POITEVIN [2000].
7 See also DEWATRIPONT AND TIROLE [1994], LEGROS AND NEWMAN [2004], and
HART AND MOORE [2005].
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[2002], ACEMOGLU et al. [2007]). PRENDERGAST [2002] mainly aims to explain
a positive relationship between risk and pay-for-performance incentives that (in
contrast to what is predicted by standard principal–agent theory) is frequently ob-
served in empirical studies.8 In PRENDERGAST [2002] an agent has to specialize
in one out of many tasks and subsequently chooses a variable effort. In contrast to
the present paper, the agent is risk-neutral and has private information about the
riskiness of output, and costly input and output monitoring by the principal are
feasible. PRENDERGAST [2002] shows that the principal prefers to retain control
over task choice if the risk is low (i.e., if the correct task is rather obvious). In this
case, through input monitoring, the principal will ensure that the agent focuses on
the desired task. On the other hand, if the risk is high (i.e., if it is unclear to the
principal what the right task is), it is optimal for the principal to delegate task choice
to the better-informed agent and to motivate him through pay for performance.9 In
ACEMOGLU et al. [2007], the agent has superior information with respect to the cor-
rect course of action. The principal has access to publicly available information only
and prefers to retain control if publicly available information is sufficiently precise.
If it is too imprecise, the principal prefers to delegate authority to the agent. Hence,
in both PRENDERGAST [2002] and ACEMOGLU et al. [2007] private information of
the agent plays a crucial role.
Third, our paper adds to a literature that explores why risk reduction by an agent
might be beneficial even from a risk-neutral principal’s perspective. At a basic level,
this might be the case because risk-averse agents need to be compensated for the
risk they bear (see, e.g., SMITH AND STULZ [1985]). In contrast, in our model risk
reduction may increase the agent’s initiative. For an alternative explanation, see,
e.g., DEMARZO AND DUFFIE [1995], who consider a model where an agent may
engage in financial hedging, which results in profits that are more informative of
project quality, thereby allowing better termination decisions.
3 The Model
A risk-neutral principal P and a risk-averse agent A conduct some project. Figure 1
illustrates the sequence of events. At date 0 the principal offers the agent a contract.
Feasible contracts are discussed in more detail below.
8 For other recent explanations of a positive risk–incentive trade-off, see, e.g.,
CORE AND QIAN [2002], BAKER AND JORGENSEN [2003], RAITH [2003], and GUO
AND OU-YANG [2006].
9 See also BESTER [2003], [2008], who focuses, not on the role of risk (which is
taken to be exogenous), but, more generally, on the role of externalities caused by cer-
tain allocations of authority. In particular, BESTER [2003] assumes that larger projects
impose higher (exogenously given) costs on the agent. In the present paper, such costs
arise through a risk–return trade-off involved in decision-making. Under special cir-
cumstances a positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation may emerge
in BESTER [2003]. However, in contrast to the present paper, he assumes that decisions
are made before effort is exerted.
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Figure 1
Sequence of Events
At date 1, the agent may provide some unobservable effort e ≥ 0, where for sim-
plicity the disutility of effort is given by 1/2e2. The agent’s effort raises the scope
of the project (i.e., the larger is e, the larger is the size of the project). At date 2,
a decision x ∈ [0, 1] has to be taken (by the principal or by the agent, whichever
has the authority). We assume that x directly determines the expected return per
unit of the project; i.e., the expected return of the project is given by e · x. For
example, in the context of retail banking discussed in the Introduction, e might
represent the number of new credit customers a branch manager approaches. In
this case, the expected return per customer might depend on whether an aggres-
sive or a conservative credit policy x is pursued. Alternatively, in the context of
manufacturing, e might represent some production quantity, and x might be deter-
mined by the subsequent marketing strategy.10 Although x determines the expected
return, the true return u per unit of the project is only realized at date 3. In the
following, we want to allow for the possibility that there is a risk–return trade-off
in decision-making; i.e., a more ambitious course of action (i.e., a higher x) might
not only yield a higher expected return, but might also come with higher risk (i.e.,
it might lead to a higher variance of the project return). Frequently, it will be the
case that a more ambitious goal involves greater risks, while the return to a more
modest course of action will (almost) be predetermined. Consequently, we assume
that u is a normally distributed random variable with expected value x and variance
r · xγ , where r > 0 and γ ≥ 0 are parameters. Our measure of exogenous risk is
given by r, i.e., a larger r will be interpreted as higher exogenous risk. For γ = 0,
the variance of the project return is independent of x, and there is no risk–return
trade-off. For γ > 0, there is a positive risk–return trade-off, i.e., in this case the
variance of the project return is increasing in x. The literature on project selection
typically assumes a strictly positive risk–return trade-off (see, e.g., HIRSHLEIFER
AND SUH [1992], DEMSKI AND DYE [1999], CORE AND QIAN [2002]). Like the
present paper, this literature considers settings where after effort provision some
10 Important for our purposes is the fact that the agent’s marginal return to effort
will depend on which decisions are taken later on. It will become clear below that, if
this were not the case, in the present setting the principal would never find it optimal
to delegate authority to the agent. See, e.g., GUO AND OU-YANG [2006], BAKER AND
JORGENSEN [2003], and SUNG [1995] for principal–agent models employing a similar
payoff structure.
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decisions have to be taken. However, this literature does not consider delegation,
but assumes that the agent has authority (for an exception, see, e.g., DUTTA AND
REICHELSTEIN [2002], which, however, differs from our model in other important
aspects).
As discussed above, the main concern of the paper is to investigate how the
underlying riskiness of projects might influence the decision of the principal to
delegate authority to the agent. In order to isolate this effect, we abstract from other
potential conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent with respect to the
decision, and assume that the parties only differ in their risk preferences. Formally,
we assume that both the principal and the agent derive a (gross) payoff of e · u from
conducting the project. These payoffs might, for example, represent private benefits
that each of the parties derives from conducting the project (e.g., due to changes
in reputation or career prospects). Alternatively, one could assume that the project
generates a total gross return of two times e · u, which the parties share equally.11
The risk-neutral principal focuses on her expected payoff from the project, which is
given by
π(e, x) ≡ E[e · u] = e · x .(1)
The risk-averse agent evaluates his payoff with a concave utility function. For
simplicity, we assume that the agent has exponential utility with constant absolute
risk aversion ρ > 0. Hence, A’s expected utility can be represented by its certainty
equivalent, which (net of effort costs) is given by12
a(e, x) ≡ e · x − 1
2
· ρ · e2 · xγ · r − 1
2
e2.(2)
While the agent’s utility is increasing in the expected value of the project return, it
is decreasing in its variance. In addition, the agent has to bear the effort costs.13 The
reservation utility of the agent is assumed to be zero.
In line with the emerging literature on partial contracting, we assume that only
control over the decision, not the decision itself, is contractible.14 Hence, at date 0
the principal (who is assumed to initially have control) may decide to delegate
authority over the decision to the agent. That is, initial contracts take the form [ j, t],
where j ∈ {A, P} denotes which of the parties has authority and where t denotes
a transfer payment from A to P.
11 Note that under this interpretation the results do not depend on the assumption
of equal sharing, but would continue to hold for any linear incentive contract.
12 For a proof of this claim, see, e.g., WOLFSTETTER [1999, p. 284 and Appendix
D (R14)].
13 While constant absolute risk aversion allows one to derive explicit solutions, this
assumption does not seem to be crucial, and at the cost of added complexity we expect
our results to hold for more general utility functions.
14 See, e.g., AGHION, DEWATRIPONT, AND REY [2002], [2004], BESTER [2003],
[2008], SCHMITZ [2005].
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4 Analysis of the Model
When deciding about whether to delegate authority to the agent, the principal aims
to maximize her expected payoff subject to the agent’s participation constraint.
Intuitively, as only control over the decision is contractible, the principal cannot
commit not to behave opportunistically at the decision stage. That is, the principal
cannot commit not to select the most profitable (but also most risky) course of
action. Consequently, the principal faces the following trade-off. On the one hand,
if the principal retains authority (P-control), she will select a large x promising her
a high expected return. However, in this case the agent anticipates that his payoff
will be relatively risky, and hence the risk-averse agent’s incentive to increase the
scope of the project will be relatively low. On the other hand, if the agent is granted
authority (A-control), the agent may find it optimal to make a decision that, while
promising only a moderate return, exposes him to less risk. As a consequence, while
under A-control the agent may distort the decision (relative to the decision preferred
by the principal), this will leave him with higher effort incentives than P-control. In
particular, in the following we show that this trade-off may make it more attractive
for the principal to delegate authority to the risk-averse agent at higher levels of
exogenous risk r.
In a first step, we consider P-control and A-control in turn. Subsequently, we
compare the principal’s payoffs under the two regimes in order to derive the princi-
pal’s optimal delegation decision. Given j-control, denote the equilibrium decisions
by x j(e) and the equilibrium effort choices by e j , where j = P, A. For the moment,
assume that P retains authority over the decision. In this case, it follows from (1)
that, at date 2, the principal chooses x P(e) = 1 for all e. Anticipating this, it follows
from (2) that the agent selects his effort level such that
eP = arg max
e
{a(e, 1)} = 1
1 + ρr ,(3)
where eP is decreasing in both exogenous risk r and the risk-aversion parameter ρ.
To summarize:
LEMMA 1 (EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOME UNDER P-CONTROL) Suppose the principal
has authority. In this case, she takes the decision that promises the highest expected
return (i.e., x P(eP) = 1), and the agent selects an effort level given by eP = 1/
(1 + ρr).
Now suppose that the principal delegates authority to the agent. This implies that,
at date 2, the agent takes some decision x A(e) maximizing his expected utility, i.e.,
x A(e) ∈ arg max
x
{a(e, x)} ,(4)
and (2) implies15
ax(e, x) = e − 12 · ρ · e
2 · γ · xγ−1 · r .(5)
15 Throughout, subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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Hence, selecting a larger x has two effects. First, it raises the expected return of the
project. At the same time, it leads to a higher variance, which reduces the agent’s
utility. This negative variance effect is the larger, the larger is the scope of the project
(i.e., the larger is e). Intuitively, the larger the project is, the more the agent will
be inclined to insure himself by choosing a course of action associated with less
risk. Consequently, there exists a threshold level ê for the scope of the project.
For effort levels below this threshold the implied risk is sufficiently small that the
agent chooses x = 1 (just as the principal would do in the case of P-control). For
levels of e above ê, A finds it optimal to distort x downwards in order to reduce his
risk exposure.
LEMMA 2 (DECISION UNDER A-CONTROL) Suppose the agent has authority. For
sufficiently low effort levels, the agent selects the same decision as the principal.
However, given sufficiently large effort levels, the agent prefers to distort the decision
downward. Formally, for e > ê we have x A(e) < 1, and x A(e) = 1 otherwise, where
ê ≡ min{2/ρrγ,2/ρr}.
Let us now turn to the agent’s effort choice at date 1, which solves
eA ∈ arg max
e
{a(e, x A(e))} .(6)
Lemma 2 raises the question under which circumstances the agent indeed finds it
optimal to choose a project scope sufficiently large to imply a subsequent downward
distortion of the decision. Only in this case will A-control and P-control lead to
different equilibrium outcomes. First, if the risk–return trade-off is sufficiently weak
(i.e., if γ is sufficiently low), A-control will lead to the same equilibrium outcome as
P-control. Second, suppose that the risk–return trade-off is sufficiently pronounced
(i.e., assume that γ is sufficiently large). If the level of exogenous risk r is relatively
low, the threshold value ê is relatively large. That is, a relatively large project
scope is required to make a downward distortion of the decision desirable for the
agent (see Lemma 2), which, given convex effort costs, will not be optimal. As a con-
sequence, A-control will again lead to the same equilibrium outcome as P-control. If,
however, the exogenous risk r is relatively large, then ê is small, and the agent finds
some e above ê profitable. In this case, A-control leads to a different outcome
from P-control: relative to P-control, the agent chooses a larger project scope, but
later on follows a course of action associated with less risk.
LEMMA 3 (EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOME UNDER A-CONTROL) Suppose the agent has
authority. If the risk–return trade-off is sufficiently pronounced and the exogenous
risk is sufficiently large, then, compared to P-control, the equilibrium effort is larger,
but the equilibrium decision is smaller. Formally, (i) eA > eP and x A(eA) < 1 if r > r̂
and γ > 2, where r̂ ≡ 2/[ρ(γ − 2)], and (ii) eA = eP and x A(eA) = 1 otherwise.
Hence, only in the case of Lemma 3(i) do the equilibrium decisions under P-control
and A-control differ (i.e., only in such cases is there an ex post conflict of interest
between the principal and the agent).
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The principal delegates authority to the agent whenever she obtains a higher total
payoff from doing so, i.e., if and only if
π(eA, x A(eA)) + t A > π(eP, x P(eP)) + t P ,(7)
where t j denotes the transfer payment from the agent to the principal under
j-control for j = A, B.16 The principal will set the transfer payment such that
the agent’s participation constraint is binding, i.e., t j = a(e j, x j(e j)) for j = P, A.
In the following, we show that whenever there is an ex post conflict of inter-
est between the parties, the principal prefers to delegate authority to the agent.
First, note that in this case we have t A = a(eA, x A(eA)) > a(eP, x P(eP)) = t P: under
A-control the agent chooses both e and x, and hence his equilibrium utility (gross of
the transfer payment) is higher than under P-control. Second, despite the fact that
under A-control a smaller x is selected, the increase in effort is sufficiently large that
the expected return of the project goes up too, i.e., π(eA, x A(eA)) > π(eP, x P(eP))
holds.
PROPOSITION 1 (OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF CONTROL) If the risk–return trade-
off is sufficiently pronounced, then, for sufficiently large exogenous risk, the risk-
neutral principal finds it strictly optimal to delegate authority to the risk-averse
agent. Otherwise, the principal retains control. Formally, A-control is strictly opti-
mal if both r > r̂ and γ > 2 hold.
Hence, Proposition 1 identifies a novel channel through which the empirically
observed positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation might emerge.
In equilibrium the agent responds to exogenous risk through a certain choice
of effort level and decision. Consequently, the equilibrium project risk (i.e., the
equilibrium variance of the project return) is endogenous. In the following, we
study how this endogenous risk varies with exogenous risk (and hence, with the
incidence of delegation). The equilibrium variance of the project return is given by
V ∗ ≡ var(e j · u) ,(8)
where j = A if r > r̂ and γ > 2, and j = P otherwise, and where the variance of u
is given by xγ · r. It can be shown that there is a hump-shaped relationship between
exogenous risk r and V ∗ (see Figure 2). First, consider the case that P-control is
optimal, where Lemma 1 and (8) imply that V ∗ = (eP)2 · r. Hence, on the one hand,
an increase in r has a direct positive effect on V ∗. On the other hand, indirectly,
larger values of r lead the agent to reduce his effort level (see Lemma 1), which
reduces the equilibrium variance of the project return. As will be shown below,
for low levels of r the former effect dominates, and endogenous risk is increasing
in r. However, for sufficiently large values of r the reduction in the effort level is
sufficient to lead to a negative relationship between r and endogenous risk. Second,
consider the case that A-control is optimal, implying that V ∗ = (eA)2 · x A(eA)γ · r. In
this case, the equilibrium variance is a decreasing function of the level of exogenous
16 If the principal is indifferent, she is assumed to retain authority (for example,
due to some (arbitrarily small) private benefits of control).
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Figure 2
Equilibrium Variance of the Project Return
risk. Intuitively, note that both the agent’s equilibrium decision and his effort are
decreasing in the exogenous risk (see Lemmas 2 and 3), and these indirect negative
effects jointly dominate the direct positive effect of r on V ∗. To summarize:
PROPOSITION 2 (ENDOGENOUS RISK) The equilibrium variance of the project
return is a hump-shaped function of exogenous risk. Formally, V ∗ is a continuous
function of r, and V ∗r > (<)0 for all r < (>)˜r, where r˜ > 0.
Interestingly, while Proposition 1 implies that in situations with larger exogenous
risk it is more likely that authority is delegated to the risk-averse agent, Proposition 2
shows that an analogous positive relationship might exist with respect to endogenous
risk and the incidence of delegation. It might very well be the case that endogenous
risk is larger in cases where A has authority than in cases where the risk-neutral
principal retains control. Such a case is illustrated by points y and z in Figure 2.
5 Conclusion
Empirical studies provide evidence for a positive relationship between exogenous
risk and delegation of authority to lower levels of a hierarchy. This paper makes
three contributions. First, motivated by these empirical findings, we identify a novel
channel through which more exogenous risk might lead to more delegation. We
consider a partial-contracting model, where a risk-averse agent may exert effort to
increase the scope of a project. Subsequent decisions may in principle be made
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either by the risk-neutral principal or by the agent, and the decisions involve a risk–
return trade-off. That is, a course of action promising a higher expected return may
imply more risk. As control over the decisions, but not the decisions themselves,
are contractible, the principal faces a commitment problem. On the one hand, if
the principal keeps authority, she will always choose the course of action yield-
ing the highest expected return. Thereby, however, the principal exposes the agent
to a lot of risk, and this may reduce the agent’s initiative. On the other hand, if
the principal delegates authority to the agent, the agent will proceed more cau-
tiously at the decision stage. Anticipating this, the agent has a higher incentive
to increase the project scope, making delegation the more attractive for the prin-
cipal, the larger is the exogenous risk. Hence, delegation might be optimal not
despite, but exactly because, the agent is risk-averse. Second, our findings pro-
vide an (incentive-based) rationale for why even a risk-neutral principal might
find it optimal to allow an agent to reduce the total firm risk. Finally, it turns
out that the relationship between endogenous risk and delegation is ambiguous.
Hence, perhaps surprisingly, it is possible that endogenous risk is larger when the
risk-averse agent has control. In general, however, the relationship between en-
dogenous risk and delegation depends on the underlying distribution of exogenous
risk.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Inspecting (5) reveals that a(e, x) is strictly concave in x if and only if γ > 1. First,
suppose γ > 1. In this case, it immediately follows from (5) that
x A(e) = γ−1
√
2
γρr
· 1
e
< 1(A1)
if e > 2/γρr, and x A(e) = 1 if e ≤ 2/γρr. Second, suppose γ ≤ 1. In this case, we
have x A(e) ∈ {0,1}. Given (2), it follows that x A(e) = 1 if e − 1/2 · ρ · e2 · r ≥ 0, that
is, if e ≤ 2/ρr. Taken together, this implies the result.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
In a first step, we prove that eA = eP and x A(eA) = x P(eP) = 1 if γ ≤ 2. Define
aA(e) ≡ a(e, x A(e)). First, suppose γ ≤ 1. Lemma 2 and (2) imply
aA(e) =
{
e − 12 · ρ · e2 · r − 12 e2 if e ≤ 2ρr ,
− 12 e2 if e > 2ρr ,
(A2)
and hence e > 2/ρr cannot be optimal, because it is dominated by e = 0. As a con-
sequence, we have eA = eP if eP = 1/(1 + ρr) ≤ 2/ρr = ê holds, which is indeed
the case. Second, suppose 1 < γ ≤ 2. To prove the claim, we again show that in
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this parameter range some e > ê cannot be optimal. For all e > ê, Lemma 2 and (2)
imply
aA(e) =
[
e · x A(e) − 1
2
· ρ · e2 · (x A(e))γ · r
]
− 1
2
e2
= e
( 2−γ
1−γ
)
·
[
ê
(
1
γ−1
)
− 1
2
· ρ · r · ê
(
γ
γ−1
)
]
− 1
2
e2
(A3)
= e
( 2−γ
1−γ
)
·
[
ê
(
1
γ−1
)
− 1
γ
· ê
(
1
γ−1
)
]
− 1
2
e2
=
(
γ − 1
γ
)
· e
( 2−γ
1−γ
)
· ê
(
1
γ−1
)
− 1
2
e2 ,
and hence
aAe (e) = −
(
2 − γ
γ
)
· e
(
1
1−γ
)
· ê 1γ−1 − e.(A4)
Consequently, if γ ≤ 2, we have aAe (e) < 0 for all e > ê, which implies eA ≤ ê.
Moreover, from Lemma 2 we know that x A(e) = 1 for all e ≤ ê. Hence, the agent
chooses the effort level that maximizes a(e, 1) subject to the constraint e ≤ ê, where
a(e, 1) is strictly concave in e. Thus, similarly to the above, we have eA = eP if
eP = 1
1 + ρr ≤
2
γρr
= ê
holds, which is indeed the case.
In a second step, we consider the parameter range γ > 2. To prove the result we
show that it depends on the sign of ae(̂e,1) = aAe (̂e ) = 1 − ê (1 + ρr) whether eA lies
above or below ê. From the first part of the proof we know that a(e, 1) is strictly
concave in e. Moreover, (A4) implies that
aAee(e) = −
(
2 − γ
γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
·
(
1
1 − γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· e
(
γ
1−γ
)
· ê 1γ−1 − 1 < 0 ,(A5)
and hence eA > ê if and only if
ae(̂e, 1) = 1 − ê(1 + ρr) > 0 ⇐⇒ 1 − 2
γρr
· (1 + ρr) > 0 ⇐⇒ r > 2
ρ(γ − 2) ≡ r̂.
In this case, it follows from (A4) that
eA =
(
γ − 2
γ
)(
êγ
γ − 2
) 1
γ
.(A6)
If, however, r ≤ 2/[ρ(γ − 2)], then by the same argument we have eA = eP . It remains
to show that eA > eP holds in the relevant parameter range (i.e., where γ > 2 and
r > r̂ ). Note that ae(̂e, 1) > 0 implies eA, eP > ê. Hence, as under both P-control
and A-control the agent faces a concave problem, in order to prove the claim it
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suffices to show that aAe (e) > ae(e, 1) holds for all e > ê. The envelope theorem and
(2) imply
aAe (e) > ae(e, 1) ⇐⇒ x A(e) − x A(e)γ ρre > 1 − ρre(A7)
⇐⇒ 1
2
ρre
[
1 − x A(e)γ ]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
>
[
1 − 1γ 1
2
ρre
]
−
[
x A(e) − x A(e)γ 1
2
ρre
]
,
which is satisfied for all e > ê, because Lemma 2 implies that the left-hand side is
strictly positive, while (4) and (2) imply that the right-hand side is strictly negative.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
A-control can only be strictly optimal if it leads to a different equilibrium outcome
from P-control, i.e., if both γ > 2 and r > r̂ (see Lemma 3) hold, which we assume
in the following. First, note that t A = a(eA, x A(eA)) > a(eP, x A(eP)) ≥ a(eP, 1) =
t P . Second, we show that π(eA, x A(eA)) > π(eP, x P(eP)) holds as well, which in
combination with (7) implies the result. Lemma 1 implies π(eP, x P(eP)) = 1/(1 + z),
where z ≡ ρr. Moreover, (A1) and (A6) imply
x A(e) = γ−1
√
ê
e
=
(
2
eγz
) 1
γ−1 =
(
2
γz
) 1
γ−1 · e−
(
1
γ−1
)
(A8)
and
x A(eA) · eA =
(
2
γz
) 1
γ−1 · (eA)
(
γ−2
γ−1
)
=
(
1
z
) 2
γ
·
(
2
γ
) 2
γ
·
(
γ − 2
γ
)
(
γ−2
γ
)
.(A9)
Hence, we have
π(eA, x A(eA)) > π(eP, x P(eP)) ⇐⇒ x A(eA) · eA > x P(eP) · eP
⇐⇒
(
1
z
) 2
γ
·
(
2
γ
) 2
γ
·
(
γ − 2
γ
)
(
γ−2
γ
)
>
1
1 + z
⇐⇒
[
z−
2
γ + z γ−2γ
]
·
⎡
⎣
(
2
γ
) 2
γ
·
(
γ − 2
γ
)
(
γ−2
γ
)
⎤
⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 1 .
(A10)
Define f(z) = z−2/γ + z(γ−2)/γ . Note that at the boundary of the parameter range
under consideration (i.e., at r = 2/[ρ(γ − 2)] ⇐⇒ z = 2/(γ − 2)) the left-hand side
of the above inequality is equal to 1. Hence, the above inequality is satisfied for all
z > 2/(γ − 2) if fz(z) > 0 for all z > 2/(γ − 2):
fz(z) > 0 ⇐⇒ − 2
γ
· z− 2γ −1 +
(
γ − 2
γ
)
· z
(
γ−2
γ
)
−1
> 0
⇐⇒ − 2
γ
· z−1 +
(
γ − 2
γ
)
> 0 ⇐⇒ z > 2
γ − 2 ,
(A11)
which concludes the proof.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
First, consider the case that P-control is optimal. Lemma 1 and (8) imply
V ∗ = 1
(1 + ρr)2 · r(A12)
and
V ∗r =
1
(1 + ρr)2 −
2ρr
(1 + ρr)3
=
(
1
1 + ρr
)2
·
(
1 − 2ρr
1 + ρr
)
=
(
1
1 + ρr
)2
·
(
1 − ρr
1 + ρr
)
.
(A13)
Hence, V ∗r > 0 ⇐⇒ r < 1/ρ. Second, if A-control is optimal, it follows from (8),
(A1), (A6), and Proposition 1 that
V ∗ =
(
2
γρ
)
γ+2
γ
·
(
γ − 2
γ
)
γ−2
γ
· r− 2γ ,(A14)
and hence in this case we have V ∗r < 0 and V ∗rr > 0. Finally, note that in the case
γ > 2 (where A-control is possibly optimal), we have (eP)2 · x P(eP)γ · r = (eA)2 ·
x A(eA)γ · r if r = r̂, and 1/ρ ≤ r̂ ⇐⇒ 1/ρ ≤ 2/[ρ(γ − 2)] ⇐⇒ γ ≤ 4, which in com-
bination with Lemma 3 concludes the proof.
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